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1.  Targets: The backbone of the 
EU energy and climate vision 
On 10 January 2007, the European 
Commission outlined the European Union’s 
‘energy and climate change vision’ based on 
two principal documents: 
•  Communication on “An energy policy 
for Europe”, and  
•  Communication on future climate change policy 
for the period post-2012 when the Kyoto 
Protocol expires, entitled “Limiting global 
climate change to 2°C: The way ahead for 2020 
and beyond”.
1 
These two documents have been complemented by 
several other sectoral policy proposals on renewables, 
the functioning and implementation of the internal 
market, infrastructure (notably electricity 
interconnectors) and sustainable coal, nuclear and 
energy technologies. In its own words, the 
Communication on “An Energy Policy for Europe” 
aims at “combating climate change, limiting the EU’s 
external vulnerability to imported hydrocarbons, and 
promoting growth and jobs, thereby providing secure 
and affordable energy to consumers”.   
Within the European Commission, the most 
controversial issue has been the nature of long-term 
targets. While greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
targets
2 and a binding EU target to source 20% of all 
energy from renewables by 2020 have been relatively 
uncontroversial from the beginning, the issue of 
additional sector-specific targets, for example for 
renewables as a share of electricity generation, and 
possibly for heating and cooling, transport and for 
combined heat and power, has been more difficult. 
The discussion about the need for these additional 
sectoral targets is likely to continue and come to the 
fore again in the negotiations in the Energy and 
Environment Councils in February, to be finally 
settled in the European Council on 8-9 March 2007.  
                                                  
1 Com (2007) 1 final and Com (2007) 2, respectively, 
both of 10.1.2007 
2 The European Commission has proposed to reduce 
emissions by at least 20% below 1990 levels by 2020.  
2.  Have targets worked in the past? 
Targets have been used by the EU to achieve certain 
policy objectives since its beginnings. The EEC 
Treaty set a target for creating a Customs Union, 
which was achieved ahead of schedule. A similar 
approach was used to create the internal market by 
1992. As it is generally assumed that this so-called 
‘1992 internal market programme target’ has been 
met, it is considered a success. On various occasions 
since 1992, the EU has attempted to apply this 
apparently successful formula. For example, it 
formulated sectoral targets for renewable energy for 
electricity (see Jansen et al., 2005) and biofuels
3. 
Moreover, there have been long-term climate change 
targets as contained in the European Council 
Conclusions from 22-23 March 2005, which 
expressed the aspiration to reduce CO2 emissions by 
industrialised countries, including the EU, by 15-30% 
by 2020.  
Not surprisingly, the issue of targets has come up 
repeatedly in the discussions over the new energy and 
climate policy. Energy Commissioner Andris 
Piebalgs, for example, raised the question of whether 
to set a number of long-term ‘sectoral’ targets such 
                                                  
3 Renewable electricity is covered by the 2001 
renewable electricity Directive that set a target of 21% 
as the share of electricity to be generated in the EU 
member states from renewable energy sources by 2010. 
It sets out differentiated member state targets while 
providing full discretion to member states on how to 
achieve these targets. The 2003 biofuels Directive on 
the promotion of biofuels and other renewable fuels for 
transport established indicative targets for member 
states. The Directive was backed up by the European 
Commission’s “EU Strategy for Biofuels” to help meet 
the 2010 target – setting a 5.75% market share for 
biofuels in the overall transport fuel supply. 
Looking for the cure-all?
Targets and the EU’s New 
Energy Strategy
Christian Egenhofer 
2 | Christian Egenhofer 
as for energy efficiency or energy intensity, 
renewables, the EU emissions trading scheme (EU 
ETS) but also for technology projects. One could also 
think of targets for combined heat and power (CHP), 
carbon capture and storage (CCS), strategic gas 
storage or energy security.
4 Commission President 
José Manuel Barroso has also considered the idea of 
an EU target for the use of low-carbon energy within 
the EU.  
The recent EU record on targets, however, is mixed 
at best. Witness the difficulties to make progress 
towards achieving the Lisbon target to transform 
Europe into “the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-driven economy by 2010”, or meeting the 
Maastricht criteria related to the eurozone or targets 
agreed for renewable energy for electricity or 
biofuels in transport. Is this attachment to targets a 
sensible way forward or merely a sign that other 
policies do not work?  
3.  Distinguishing types of targets 
It is important to distinguish among different 
categories of targets. The first are hard targets, such 
as the greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol. For EU member states, 
these are legally binding, and if they are not 
achieved, sanctions will kick in. A similar but distinct 
second category are the so-called ‘indicative targets’ 
such as those mentioned above on renewable energy 
for electricity and for biofuels.
5 They are still 
mandatory but differ from hard targets in the level of 
commitment required. Member states need to make 
an effort to meet them, but they can divert from them 
to some degree if they have good reasons. It is 
unclear how a lack of achievement will be 
sanctioned. A final category includes aspirational 
targets. These express long-term objectives or 
aspirations, such as the EU target that “the overall 
global mean surface temperature increase should not 
exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels” or a 15-30% 
reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020. The so-called 
‘Lisbon objective’ of making the EU the most 
competitive economy falls in the same category. 
Similarly, the 20% reduction target of energy 
consumption formulated in the Energy Efficiency 
                                                  
4 A concept of energy security targets has been as 
developed jointly by the Energy research Centre of the 
Netherlands (ECN) and the Clingendael Institute (see 
Scheepers et al., 2006). 
5 Renewable electricity is covered by the renewable 
electricity Directive, which sets out differentiated 
member state targets while providing full discretion to 
member states on how to achieve these targets. For 
biofuels, fulfilling the target is principally left to 
member states albeit within an EU framework. 
Action Plan
6 can be seen as an aspiration or 
illustration. Such targets are meant to guide policy-
making. Distinguished from EU targets should be 
legally-binding obligations based on EU policies. An 
example of the latter is the EU emissions trading 
system, which is an EU policy that obliges member 
states to set a cap for the covered sector in such a 
way that it, inter alia, allows the member state to 
comply with the Kyoto Protocol target.  
4.  Best practice of target-setting  
Proponents argue that targets can be useful in 
achieving policy objectives or moving sectors in a 
certain direction. And even if targets are not met in 
full, the result is likely still to be better than what 
would have been obtained in their absence. 
Opponents argue that targets segment the internal 
market, if the targets are national or differentiated 
between member states. The internal market may be 
distorted as in the case of the EU ETS, where the cap 
is set by each member state separately (see Zetterberg 
et al., 2004; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2005; 
Egenhofer, Fujiwara, Ahman & Zetterberg, 2006), 
while rent-seeking by lobbies is encouraged 
(Michaelowa, 2004; Fullerton & Metcalf, 2001). In 
addition, if targets are too ambitious, there is a risk of 
imposing excessive costs, making targets politically 
untenable, which might eventually lead to a reversal 
of policy. Under such a scenario, the international 
credibility of the EU in the area of climate change 
might suffer as a consequence. 
There should be little problem with the first category 
of targets. They are legally binding and thus 
enforceable, they rely on standard EU policy 
formulation and implementation and they are by 
definition compatible with the internal market.
7 More 
importantly, EU law based on the co-decision 
procedure has to undergo an integrated impact 
assessment (see Renda, 2006) and faces scrutiny 
through inter-service consultation between the 
various directorates-general in the European 
Commission and subsequently in the Council and 
European Parliament structures (van Schaik et al., 
2006). More problematic are indicative or 
aspirational targets or EU targets that express a vision 
of where the EU and its member states want to go in 
a given time. The risks are especially high if ‘EU 
target setting’ becomes a substitute for EU policies, 
for example in the absence of appropriate EU 
competencies or a lack of consensus within the EU. 
In such cases, national solutions can undermine the 
internal market.  
                                                  
6 Measures proposed in the Energy Efficiency Action 
Plan do not meet the 20% target.  
7 By definition, EU law is compatible with EU primary, 
secondary and case law such as the provisions on the 
internal market and competition.  
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Defining the objectives  
Targets constitute an important intervention in the 
market. The more targets there are, the less flexibility 
there is for the market to allocate resources. 
Ultimately, targets can degenerate into ‘planning’ 
tools, overriding market incentives and reinforcing 
rent-seeking. Given these potential negative impacts 
on markets, targets should meet a number of 
preconditions.  
•  Objectives should be significant. Targets should 
only be used if the objective is significant, e.g. 
energy security or long-term climate change. 
Even then, however, targets should be carefully 
analysed to anticipate their impact on the internal 
market. It is important to choose an appropriate 
baseline to ensure that different sectors and/or 
member states face similar challenges.  
•  Objectives must be realistic and achievable. 
There should be some guarantee that the required 
result can be achieved in an efficient way. 
Objectives should be realistic and achievable at a 
reasonable cost, i.e. that ‘what is needed’ is 
broadly in line with ‘what is possible’. This 
means that objectives are quantifiable, i.e. can be 
proven to be achieved. One should be careful not 
to overload targets. Targets can only fulfil one 
objective
8 and not several at the same time, 
although all costs and benefits
9 should be 
factored in when targets are set.  
•  Objectives must be properly formulated. The 
most critical point is to formulate the target in the 
proper way. It is particularly important to define 
the required outcome (e.g. near-zero carbon 
power generation) rather than prescribe the 
possible solutions (e.g. renewables, nuclear, 
CCS, etc.). In that way, the market will be able to 
choose the most economic solution. However, 
sectoral targets (e.g. for renewables, CCS) may 
be needed for a transition period, to avoid 
crowding out certain technologies, which would 
result in a smaller technology portfolio for near-
zero-carbon technologies than otherwise would 
be the case. For example, most if not all new 
renewable-generation technologies will need to 
be subsidised for a certain period, not the least of 
which purpose to bring down the costs. 
                                                  
8 E.g. boosting renewables to bring down technology 
costs, increasing biofuels to increase supply flexibility 
for transport fuels or achieving a certain number of CCS 
projects for demonstration purposes. 
9 For a full analysis of costs and benefits of different 
climate change options, see Egenhofer, Jansen, Bakker 
& Jussila Hammes (2006). 
EU or member state targets  
Targets can be set at the member state or the EU 
level. From an internal market and allocation 
perspective, targets would be ideally set at the EU 
level, but the current heterogeneity of member states 
in terms of economic development, the structure of 
the energy sector – particularly in power generation –
and national preferences, makes this very difficult. 
Another factor is the limited power that the EU can 
exercise – in general – to enforce targets, unless they 
are part of an EU law. As a result, the EU has broken 
down overall targets into national targets (e.g. the 
1998 Burden-Sharing Agreement for the Kyoto 
Protocol), but this has given rise to fears of market 
distortions in the industrial and power sectors. 
Similarly, member state policies to stimulate 
electricity generation from renewable sources have 
triggered concerns over barriers to trade affecting 
competition and distortions to competition (Jansen et 
al., 2005).  
The level of ambition  
If the deadlines for achieving targets are set on an 
excessively short-term basis, they can create 
rigidities, whereas long-term targets can lack 
credibility. Long-term targets are political by 
definition, in that they express a political ambition on 
the part of a generation of politicians. The fact that 
such targets are seldom based on an economic 
analysis of the costs and benefits of different options 
and tend to be ambitious can mean that they may turn 
out to be excessively costly. This can undermine 
political acceptability with the result that the next 
generation of politicians will abandon them. In 
extreme cases, this can result in ‘boom-and-bust’ 
cycles, as we have seen in the field of renewables in 
the US. Therefore, the credibility of targets should 
therefore increase the more realistic, i.e. achievable, 
they are. An important additional factor accounting 
for the credibility of a target is whether it makes 
allowances for member state differences and 
preferences, as discussed in the previous section, e.g. 
resource endowment or CO2 intensity.  
One way of potentially overcoming this credibility 
gap would be to formulate a set of minimum targets 
or obligations at EU level, with individual member 
states being free to go further if they wished.
10  
Credible implementation strategies  
Targets can only make a difference if they are backed 
up by implementation strategies. Long-term targets 
usually make explicit trade-offs (e.g. between 
competitiveness of industry and climate change 
targets) that need to be settled. These trade-offs are 
                                                  
10 The UK and Sweden, for example, have done 
precisely that in the area of climate change targets.  
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more likely to be addressed when the detailed 
implementation strategies are formulated by the EU 
or by member states. If an implementation strategy is 
formulated by the member states, it is indispensable 
that the European Commission is allowed to judge 
whether a strategy is credible and to track its 
progress, while at the same time enabling an 
examination of whether the member state policies 
interfere with the internal market and more generally, 
are cost-effective.  
5.  Conditions for targets to work in the 
EU 
From this brief analysis, we can identify a number of 
key conditions that are crucial to make indicative or 
aspirational targets work in the EU. If these are met, 
targets can be useful in steering investment in a 
certain direction while avoiding the most important 
risks: market segmentation, rent-seeking, lack of 
credibility or reversal of a policy leading to stranded 
investment.  
•  Targets are a good means to express a vision of 
what the EU and its member states hope to 
achieve.  
•  They need to be long-term to allow sufficient 
time for the necessary investment to follow.  
•  At the same time, targets need to be credible.  
a)  Credibility can be increased by ensuring that 
targets are realistic and achievable – based 
on sound economic analysis.  
b)  They need to be backed by detailed and 
realistic implementation strategies either at 
member state or EU level. 
c)  Targets need to be quantifiable, in order to 
ensure that their achievement can be 
measured. 
•  Another way of overcoming a potential 
credibility gap could be to formulate minimum 
targets or obligations at EU level with member 
states being free to take further measures. 
•  Since targets constitute a significant intervention, 
they should only be applied in cases where the 
objective to be achieved is significant.  
•  Targets must concentrate on outcomes (e.g. near-
zero carbon technologies) instead of prescribing 
the solution (e.g. carbon capture and storage, 
renewables, nuclear or fusion). In that way, the 
market will be able to choose the most economic 
solution. However, sectoral targets may be 
needed for a transition period to avoid crowding 
out certain technologies.  
•  Targets are best expressed on an EU-wide basis 
in order  to ensure that resources are optimally 
allocated. Any specification of targets and their 
implementation needs to respect member state 
differences and preferences as long as they do 
not undermine the internal market. The European 
Commission has an important role to play in this 
regard.  
If targets are expressed at member state level, 
policy should be guided by the following: 
-  If quotas or obligations are used, they 
should be tradable across borders to 
ensure the greatest efficiency and 
convergence of costs across the EU. 
-  If subsidies are used, the overall level of 
subsidy for the same product or service per 
member state should be comparable (to 
prevent investors from shopping around and 
starting a race for subsidies).
11 
•  There should only be a few, and ideally only 
one target, to avoid the incompatibility of targets 
which creates additional rigidity. 
                                                  
11 The same principle should apply if a tax or constraint 
is used, although this point may be more theoretical. It 
is very difficult for a member state to maintain a 
situation in which it treats ‘its’ industries worse than 
other member states.   
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